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In practice, economic policy goals can be at odds with competition policy. While
policy makers often put forward the protection of jobs,1 in banking, the stabilization of
financial markets is a major policy goal, especially during the recent financial crisis. Al-
lowing market consolidation through mergers served as a measure to mitigate the adverse
effects of the financial crisis in several cases (e.g. JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns,
or Bank of America and Merrill Lynch in the U.S.; Lloyds and HBOS in the U.K.; and
mergers between Landesbanken in Germany).
Such measures, however, were controversial from the perspective of competition po-
licy in the markets. For instance, the Competition and Markets Authority in the U.K.
(formerly Office of Fair Trading) objected to the merger of Lloyds and HBOS, voicing
concerns about the greater than 30% market share of the new entity and the elimination
of HBOS as a challenger to the four larger established banks. Despite these concerns, the
U.K. Secretary of State overruled the objection in accordance with the Bank of England,
the Financial Services Authority, and the Treasury, stressing the necessity to maintain
financial stability (Vives, 2016). This example illustrates the dilemma policy makers
may find themselves in. While mergers might be instrumented to mitigate the effects
of financial crises, interventions could result in increases of market power harmful to
consumers.
In this paper, we investigate the competition effects of the merger of ABN AMRO
and Fortis Bank NL in the Dutch retail banking market. Being one of the largest bank
takeovers in recent years, financial stability concerns prompted policy makers to engage
in substantial market interventions involving state aid. Originally, Fortis intended to
take over the Dutch business of ABN AMRO. However, after facing serious difficulties
raising capital after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Fortis needed to be nationalized
by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Dutch state decided to complete
the merger in the already concentrated Dutch market.
The Dutch state’s decision to continue the merger after bailing out the banks was
1See, e.g., the EDEKA/Kaiser’s Tengelmann merger in the German supermarket sector in 2015.
Although the merger had been prohibited by the German Federal Cartel Office, the German Minister of
Economic Affairs issued a ministerial authorization conditionally clearing the merger arguing that job
security prevails over the expected restraints on competition.
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justified by expected yearly pre-tax synergies of 1.1 billion euros, integration costs of
about 1.2 billion euros, and the aim to earn back the cost of its intervention (European
Commission, 2011).2 The EC’s conditional merger approval included divestment remedies
worth 1.12 billion euros, which, however, did not affect all business units. The retail
business unit, for instance, remained untouched by divestments.
To analyze the merger for potential anti-competitive effects, we focus on the Dutch
market for savings accounts – a market which is deemed highly concentrated by both
the Dutch central bank (DNB, 2015) and the Dutch competition authority (ACM, 2014)
years after the merger. Looking at the anti-competitive effects of the merger during and
after the global financial crisis might be even more relevant, given the more pronounced
effect of income shocks on consumers during recessions.
To single out the competition effects of the merger from the generally lowered interest
rate environment, we employ estimates from a structural model to simulate product-level
interest rates for the two distinct cases of joint and separate ownership of ABN AMRO
and Fortis Bank NL for 2010, with data from the calibration period 2007 to 2009. We mo-
del demand for savings accounts as discrete choice for differentiated goods by identifying
the consumers’ product choice on the market for savings accounts. Employing a disag-
gregated approach based on the characteristics of both products and consumers helps to
attenuate the endogeneity problem between prices and unobserved product characteris-
tics by assuming that a single household has no impact on savings account deposit rates
nor characteristics (Goldberg, 1995). On the supply side, we model interactions between
banks assuming Bertrand Nash competition in a multiproduct oligopoly. Calibrating the
model with demand-side interest rate elasticities derived from a random-coefficients logit
model allows us to simulate bank behavior in the two different scenarios of joint and
separate ownership of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL. By making adjustments to the
ownership structure in the model, we contrast predicted pricing behavior of the banks
2The merger was initially motivated by referring to similar figures prior to the crisis. In its offer, the
consortium anticipated pre-tax synergies of 1.3 billion euros p.a. and integration costs of 1.54 billion eu-
ros for the Fortis/ABN AMRO merger. See https://investors.rbs.com/~/media/Files/R/RBS-IR/
archived-presentations/archived/consortium-presentation-29-may-07.pdf, last accessed on Oc-
tober 24, 2019.
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in the merger case with the no-merger case. Comparing predicted values of both cases
instead of comparing model predictions to realized values allows us to isolate the compe-
tition effects induced by a changed ownership structure from changes in financial market
conditions.
Our empirical analysis draws on the representative DNB Household Survey (DHS)
comprising detailed yearly information on the savings behavior of individuals from more
than 2,000 Dutch households. We merge the survey data with product-level information
on savings accounts, including interest rates and account restrictions (used for product
differentiation) retrieved from price comparison websites specialized on the Dutch market
for financial savings products.3 Our main data covers the years from 2007 to 2010,
enabling us to observe consumer choice conditional on relevant product characteristics
and corresponding individual choice sets over time.
We predict that the merger had a significant effect on interest rates in the market.
In our model, in the case of a merger, ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL have 3% and
5% lower interest rates, respectively, as compared to the case of no merger. The other
competitors lower their interest rates by up to 1%. Furthermore, we are able to identify
heterogeneous consumer effects. Less educated consumers with lower savings are most
affected. Our results suggest that the anti-competitive effects entail a total consumer
welfare loss of about 69 million euros in 2010. Our robustness checks with different as-
sumptions on expectations on the changing monetary environment confirm these results.
Bearing in mind that we only analyze the market for savings accounts, the impact of the
merger on retail consumers might be even larger, given potential anti-competitive effects
for other financial products such as fixed-term deposits, checking accounts, or mortgage
loans. This raises the notion of taking into account these additional social costs when
merging banks for the sake of financial stability.
Our paper aligns with both the empirical banking literature and the applied industrial
organization literature using structural models to conduct counterfactual analyzes. In this
regard, there has been an increasing number of such studies in banking recently. Crawford
3We obtain most data from www.spaarinformatie.nl and also employ information from
www.spaarrekeningen.nl and www.spaarrentehulp.nl.
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et al. (2018) build a comprehensive model to analyze interactions between asymmetric
information and imperfect competition in the Italian lending markets. Egan et al. (2017)
analyze the feedback loop between financial distress and the ability to access (uninsured)
deposits in the US. Honka et al. (2017) investigate how advertising influences consumer
choice in the US retail banking market. Molnar et al. (2013) estimate demand for deposit
services in order to test supply models in the Italian retail banking market. Finally, Dick
(2008) uses a structural model to estimate demand for deposit services of U.S. commercial
banks and measures the effects of US branching deregulation.
Examples for merger simulations are Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016), Ivaldi and
Verboven (2005) and Molnar (2008). Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) conduct a merger
simulation and ex-post evaluation in the Swedish market for analgesics to test merger
simulation as a prediction tool. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) analyze a merger in the
European truck market and compare the prediction of the merger simulation to other
market power tests. Molnar (2008) applies merger simulation to the Finish banking
market using aggregated data.
While many other studies follow Berry et al. (1995) and analyze consumer choice
in a discrete choice setting using aggregated data, our contribution to the merger si-
mulation literature employs consumer-level data. The use of such disaggregated data is
better suited to describe demand choices driven by heterogeneous preferences and gene-
ral substitution patterns. We further rely on the assumption that individual consumers
are price takers and thus respond to concerns about the simultaneity bias inherent to
demand estimation at the market level. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to apply merger simulation methods in the context of banking using disaggregated data.
We aim to contribute to the understanding of the banking markets, given its importance
for national economies.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide background in-
formation on the merger of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL, and the Dutch banking
market. Section 2 introduces the model and the steps we undertake for simulation.
Section 3 describes in detail the compilation of our dataset. Sections 4 and 5 present
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the estimation and our results, respectively, while section 6 provides a summary and
conclusion.
1 The Merger of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL
The sale of ABN AMRO was initiated by a publicly disclosed letter of the British hedge
fund TCI complaining to ABN AMRO about poor share price returns, urging to “actively
pursue the potential break up, spin-off, sale or merger.”4 The letter from February 2007
echoed in the media, reinforcing discussions and negotiations about a sale of ABN AMRO.
After a bidding battle between the British bank Barclays and a consortium of Royal Bank
of Scotland, Fortis, and Banco Santander, the majority of ABN AMRO’s shareholders
accepted the consortium’s offer worth 71.1 billion euros in October 2007, making it one
of today’s largest bank takeovers.
The consortium’s plan to split the assets of ABN AMRO allowed the Royal Bank
of Scotland to obtain the business units Private and Business Clients in Asia, Europe,
and North America, while Banco Santander received Banco Real and Antonveneta. Fortis
obtained the business units Asset Management, Private Banking, and Netherlands, which
it intended to merge with its own Dutch arm Fortis Bank NL. All cases were subject to
merger control by the European Commission.
Regarding the Dutch assets, the EC conditionally approved the merger of ABN AMRO
and Fortis in October 2007. The European Commission (2007) had concerns regarding the
Dutch commercial banking market insofar as the combination of the first (ABN AMRO)
and fourth largest bank (Fortis Bank NL) would significantly increase the already high
concentration level. It requested the sale of several components of the Dutch business
unit before the merger could become legal in order to protect corporate customers from
reduced competition. The EC, however, did not raise concerns about anti-competitive
effects in the similarly concentrated retail banking market on account of the modest
market share of Fortis Bank NL (them being a distant fourth player in terms of market
4See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2804714/Letter-from-TCI-to-ABN-Amro.html, last
accessed on October 24, 2019.
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position after ING, Rabobank, and ABN AMRO).
In the first half of 2008, the consortium sold the individual business units to the
consortium members. At the same time, Fortis was preparing the sale of the merger
remedy to Deutsche Bank when the global financial crisis of 2008 broke out. Fortis faced
liquidity issues in part because of the high acquisition price for ABN AMRO (share of
Fortis: 24 billion euros), needing to be eventually rescued in a combined effort of the three
governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Dutch state purchased
the Dutch business of Fortis for 16.8 billion euros in October 2008. This move also
included the stake in the holding of the consortium comprising the Dutch activities of
ABN AMRO.
Willing to finalize the intended but frozen merger (European Commission, 2011, re-
cital 42), the Dutch state provided liquidity facilities to implement the separation of the
Dutch activities of ABN AMRO from the holding of the consortium, and to cover the
costs of the EC divestiture-remedy realized as the sale of several components to Deut-
sche Bank in April 2010. While this resulted in the finalization of the initial merger of
Fortis Bank NL and ABN AMRO in July 2010, the capital injections of the Dutch state
were subject to state aid investigations by the EC. The European Commission (2011)
concluded in April 2011 that the recapitalization measures amounting to between 4.2
and 5.45 billion euros (excluding the takeover price5) constituted state aid. Yet the EC
acknowledged that the need for supporting the banks rather stemmed from undercapita-
lization than excessive risk taking or unsustainable business models, thereby approving
the support package.
The approval, however, was subject to a set of conditions, including (amongst others)
a ban on acquisitions and on advertising state ownership, as well as restrictions on price
leadership for standardized savings and mortgage products. In other words, ABN AMRO
was not allowed to offer price conditions which could not be matched by non-aided com-
petitors. These conditions were set for a duration of three years and would be prolonged
to a maximum of five years if the Dutch state continued to hold more than 50% of the
5The purchase price was not considered as representing state aid to the two entities as they did not
receive the corresponding money.
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ordinary shares after three years. During the state aid investigations, the Dutch state
expressed its commitment to a complete exit, aiming to recover its initial investment plus
funding costs. Despite a successful IPO in November 2015, the Dutch state still held a
56.3% stake in ABN AMRO in October 2019.6 The bans therefore only expired in April
2016.7
Years after the merger, the Dutch central bank has concluded that high concentration
is persistent in the Dutch banking sector, calling for less dominance of large banks and the
necessity to promote the position of small banks and niche players. It mentions the recent
mergers in the market (ABN AMRO/Fortis Bank NL and Rabobank/Friesland Bank) as
one source of high concentration (DNB, 2015). Furthermore, the Dutch competition aut-
hority finds that the retail banking sector has become less competitive after the financial
crisis and identifies the consumers’ limited propensity to switch banks (consumer inertia)
as another reason for low competitiveness (ACM, 2014).
2 Model
In our analysis of merger effects, we focus on the Dutch market for savings accounts.
As for other retail banking markets, we choose this market because we can more easily
compare between products contrary to other banking products. For instance, fixed-
term deposits might exhibit different maturities and are thus not easily comparable.
Another argument for comparability is that fees do not apply to savings accounts (in the
Netherlands). Furthermore, for savings accounts, we can be more confident that consumer
choice is driven by a single saving motive, contrary to checking accounts which primarily
serve to cater transactional purposes (e.g. payments, reference account to receive salary,
etc.).
Our analysis is based on a structural model comprising demand and supply as two
building blocks. We use estimated demand-side parameters to calibrate the model. Ma-
king assumptions on joint bank behavior closes the model. With our model, we are able
6See https://www.abnamro.com/en/about-abnamro/our-company/corporate-governance/
shareholder-structure/index.html, last accessed on October 24, 2019.
7The prolongation did not apply to the price leadership ban which was set for three years only.
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to simulate different market outcomes regarding changes in the ownership of the banks.
2.1 Demand
We use a mixed multinomial logit model (mixed logit model) for the demand side. As-
suming a random utility model (RUM), we can interpret the mixed logit model as a
random-coefficients model in which the coefficients vary between individuals.
Indirect utility of consumer 𝑖 for the savings account product 𝑗 of bank 𝑏 at time 𝑡
can be expressed as
𝑈 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑉
𝑖
𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖
𝑖
𝑗𝑡
= 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽
𝑖 + 𝑦𝑗𝑡𝛾 + 𝜖
𝑖
𝑗𝑡,
𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝐼, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝐽, 𝑏 = 1, ..., 𝐵, 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇.
(1)
The term 𝑉 𝑖𝑗𝑡 reflects the deterministic part of consumer utility and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random term
which is iid extreme value. In our discrete choice setting, each consumer chooses one
product from a set of alternatives. RUM consistency implies that a consumer chooses the
alternative yielding the highest utility. Furthermore, in the random-coefficients model we
can differentiate between variables for which the coefficients 𝛽𝑖 differ across individuals
(i.e. 𝑥𝑗𝑡) and variables for which the coefficients 𝛾 are constant (i.e. 𝑦𝑗𝑡). Note that the
corresponding vector of coefficients for 𝑥𝑗𝑡 carries the superscript 𝑖 in equation (1).8
The mixed multinomial logit is a generalized form of the the standard conditional
logit model introduced by McFadden (1973). The probability of individual 𝑖 choosing
alternative 𝑗 conditional on the vector of random coefficients 𝛽𝑖 of individual 𝑖 is repre-
sented by (for expository purposes we will omit the time index 𝑡 from here onwards):9
8Note also that the random coefficients model as presented above can be rewritten to 𝑈 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝛽 +
𝑧𝑗𝑡𝜇
𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, where 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑧𝑗𝑡𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the random part of utility. In this error component
representation, correlation between alternatives is introduced by the random component 𝑧𝑗𝑡𝜇𝑖 contrary
to the standard logit where the error component consists solely of the iid component 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡.
9The subsequent paragraphs introducing the mechanics of the mixed logit follow Train (2009).
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𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝛽𝑖) =
exp
(︀
𝑉 𝑖𝑗 (𝛽
𝑖)
)︀∑︀
𝑘 exp (𝑉
𝑖
𝑘 (𝛽
𝑖))
. (2)
The individual vector 𝛽𝑖, however, is not observable. The (unconditional) mixed logit
probability for individual 𝑖 to choose alternative 𝑗 is derived as an integral of the standard
logit probabilities by integrating out the vector of random parameters 𝛽𝑖 and represented
by
𝑃 𝑖𝑗 =
∫︁ (︃
exp
(︀
𝑉 𝑖𝑗 (𝛽
𝑖)
)︀∑︀
𝑘 exp (𝑉
𝑖
𝑘 (𝛽
𝑖))
)︃
𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽, (3)
where 𝑓(𝛽) is the mixing distribution of the vector of random coefficients, usually specified
to be normal or log-normal.10
One of the advantages of the mixed logit model vis-à-vis the conditional logit mo-
del or the nested logit model is that it does not exhibit the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property at any stage. In the conditional logit model, the ratio of pro-
babilities of two alternatives is independent of the attributes or the existence of all other
alternatives yielding rigid substitution patterns. The nested logit model mitigates this
problem as the IIA property does not hold for alternatives in different nests. However,
it still holds within each nest and the nesting structure requires further assumptions on
potential product groupings. In contrast, in the mixed logit model the ratio of probabili-
ties of alternative 𝑗 and alternative 𝑗′ is dependent on all attributes and the existence of
other alternatives than 𝑗 or 𝑗′. Equation (4) for the cross-price elasticity of a change in
the interest rate 𝑑 of alternative 𝑗 illustrates the flexibility in the substitution patterns:
𝜂𝑖𝑗′𝑗 = −
𝑑𝑗
𝑃 𝑖𝑗′
∫︁
𝛽𝑖𝑑𝐿
𝑖
𝑗(𝛽)𝐿
𝑖
𝑗′(𝛽)𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽, (4)
where 𝛽𝑖𝑑 is the individual coefficient on the interest rate 𝑑𝑗. The elasticity differs for
10Note that the mixed logit probabilities collapse to the standard logit probabilities when all coefficients
are identical across individuals.
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each alternative 𝑗′. That is, an increase in the interest rate for alternative 𝑗 will lead to
different decreases in the probabilities for each alternative 𝑗′ unlike in the standard logit
model where the probability of choosing alternative 𝑗′ is canceled out in the formula for
the cross-price elasticity. Furthermore, the change in the probability to choose alternative
𝑗′ depends on the correlation between the conditional likelihoods of choosing alternative
𝑗′ and 𝑗. Alternatives with similar attributes exhibit more switching between each other
following price changes. To conclude, in the mixed logit model, the substitution patterns
are determined by the mixing distribution and therefore determined empirically by the
available data. Apriori assumptions on product groupings are not required.
The disaggregated approach helps to attenuate the endogeneity problem between pri-
ces and unobserved product characteristics by assuming that individual demand is sig-
nificantly small as not to affect firm behavior and thus characteristics nor deposit rates
of savings accounts (Goldberg, 1995). Based on the individual-level choices, we derive
market-level demand to be used in our simulation exercises through aggregation. For
aggregation, we construct population weights based on the distribution of bank choice in
our untreated sample, the representative DNB Household Survey.11
2.2 Supply
In a simplified banking model, banks generate profits by lending money to firms below
their own borrowing costs. As a common approach to the separate analysis of deposit or
loan markets, we allow for separate modeling of pricing decisions in the deposit market
(see for example Canhoto (2004) or Pita Barros (1999)). We assume banks to maximize
profits in the market for savings accounts with the deposit rates as their choice variables.
In our case, the choice variables (i.e. the deposit rates) have a negative direct effect
on profits. In order not to formulate a degenerated problem, we add 𝑟𝑏, which is the
expected loan rate for bank 𝑏. This set-up acknowledges that banks raise deposits to
11For our estimation analysis on the product level, we only use observations with consistent answers
for product choice as described in the data section. The question for the main bank for savings accounts
is answered more frequently, as some respondents do not report the exact account product but the
corresponding bank. By weighting according to bank choice, we aim to obtain representative weights for
the aggregation procedure.
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finance lending.12 Each bank thus has an individual, model-exogenous expectation on its
returns on deposits.
Offering savings accounts to consumers involves both variable and fixed operating
costs which differ across account products. Variable costs are, for example, additional
needs for IT capacity and employees for administration and the provision of customer
services. The difference in variable costs across products can result from reduced costs
for services as for example for internet managed accounts or from differences in cost
efficiencies across banks. We introduce product-specific costs 𝑐𝑗 denoting the per unit of
demand costs for account product 𝑗. We assume 𝑐𝑗 for each product to be constant over
time. The maximization problem of bank 𝑏 offering a subset of products 𝐹𝑏 can therefore
be written as:
max
{𝑑𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 ∈𝐹𝑏}
𝜋𝑏(d) =
∑︁
𝑗∈𝐹𝑏
(𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗)𝑞𝑗(d), (5)
where 𝑞𝑗(d) depicts demand for savings account 𝑗 and d is a 𝐽×1 vector of deposit rates.
We can think of the term 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐𝑗 (= 𝑟𝑗,𝑛𝑒𝑡) as the expected loan rate (net of marginal
costs) specific to product 𝑗. Setting 𝑑𝑗 allows the bank to set the profit margin, 𝑟𝑗,𝑛𝑒𝑡−𝑑𝑗
for product 𝑗. This is analogous to the formulation of the problem when prices enter
positively into the firms’ profit functions and profit margins are equal to 𝑝𝑗 −𝑚𝑐𝑗.
Taking into account the optimal pricing decision rules for all banks while assuming
Bertrand competition, the Nash equilibrium is defined by the following system of first-
order conditions:
−𝑞𝑗(d) +
∑︁
𝑘∈𝐹𝑏
(𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐𝑘 − 𝑑𝑘)𝜕𝑞𝑘(d)
𝜕𝑑𝑗
= 0, 𝑗 = 1, ...𝐽. (6)
Equation (6) can be rewritten in vector notation:
−q(d) + {𝜃 ⊙Δ(d)}(rnet − d) = 0 (7)
where q(d) is the 𝐽 × 1 demand vector, rnet is the 𝐽 × 1 expected net loan rate vector
12Banks can also use savings accounts as instruments meant to acquire client information, or to cross
sell (Džmuráňová & Teplý, 2016).
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and Δ(d) ≡ 𝜕q(d)/𝜕d′ is the 𝐽 ×𝐽 Jacobian of first derivatives. 𝜃 is the 𝐽 ×𝐽 product-
ownership matrix, with 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 if savings accounts 𝑗 and 𝑘 are offered by the same
bank and 𝜃(𝑗, 𝑘) = 0 otherwise. ⊙ depicts element-by-element multiplication. Equation
(7) can be used to back out the term rnet, which we need for the subsequent merger
simulation.
2.3 Merger Simulation
We simulate product-level interest rates for the two distinct cases of joint and separate
ownership of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL for 2010 in order to obtain simulated
changes in the interest rates induced by the merger. We fit equation (7) with actual
data from 2009 to back out the expected net loan rate vector r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 . In order to simulate
interest rates for 2010, following Björnerstedt and Verboven (2014) we rewrite equation
(7) and solve for 2010 interest rates for both cases, d2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∈ {merger, no merger}.
Thus, we are using bank first-order conditions based on estimated pre-merger demand
parameters, expected net loan rates r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 and the respective product-ownership matrix
𝜃2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 :
d2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 = r
2009
𝑛𝑒𝑡 − {𝜃2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 ⊙Δ2009(d2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 )}−1q(d2010𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 ). (8)
We solve for deposit rates using the system of linear demand functions q(d) = a+Δ(d)′d
employing a constant Jacobian matrix of first derivatives Δ(d) and a being the vector of
intercepts (Davis & Garcés, 2010). We simulate prices on the product level and provide
aggregated bank-level effects of the merger using product-level market shares as weights.
The benefit of simulating merger effects for 2010 is that the products of the merging
entity mostly stayed in the market until at least until 2011. Therefore, we do not have
to consider strategic product portfolio rebalancing decisions.
Note that our simulation is based on the assumption of constant expected net loan
rates, i.e. we employ pre-merger r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 . In this vein, we isolate the competition effects
induced by a changed ownership structure from changes in financial market conditions.
The low interest rate environment is presumed to affect the expected net loan rates of
12
banks, as their lending conditions might change.13
As robustness checks, we adjust the estimates for the expected net loan rate using
the change of the 3-months Euribor interbank lending rate between 2009 and 2010 to
account for less profitable investment possibilities mainly resulting from changing mo-
netary policy.14 We employ three approaches to capture the effects of the Euribor. (i)
We simply add the (negative) difference in the interbank lending rate.15 (ii) We identify
the relationship between pre-merger r𝑛𝑒𝑡 and Euribor based on a regression and add the
estimated (negative) effect of a changed Euribor. (iii) We estimate the same relationship
as in (ii) using the full period 2007-2014.
Note that in the third case, we employ backed-out r𝑛𝑒𝑡 from all years. This approach
incorporates the assumption that the form of competition does not change. That is, we
always assume Bertrand Nash competition in a multiproduct oligopoly. This assumption
can be challenged not only because of the merger itself but also the involvement of state
aid with its behavioral restrictions. Evidence by Dijkstra and Schinkel (2019) suggests
that the price leadership bans, which also applied to other state-aided Dutch banks,
shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a fully collusive price leadership
equilibrium. Although the price leadership bans were also targeted at the savings market,
we argue that the markets for savings and mortgages are different.16 In section 3 we
provide additional (anecdotal) evidence for Bertrand competition in the savings market
in our calibration period. Still, the years after the merger could be affected such that
this robustness check has to be considered with caution.
Finally, we want to stress that our analysis aims to isolate the competition effects
of the merger. The aforementioned robustness checks help us to obtain predictions that
13We do not expect, however, that consumer preferences change as quickly; their utility maximization
would still be primarily driven by achieving the highest deposit earnings.
14That is, we substitute r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 by r^2010net =r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 +Δ𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 in simulations using equation (8).
15The yearly average of the 3-months Euribor dropped from 1.23% in 2009 to 0.81% in 2010.
16Mortgages do not serve a savings purpose; consumers use them to finance home purchases. Pricing
of the price leader is (barometrically) based on the nearest rival’s funding costs – a particularity that
the largest non-aided bank Rabobank seems to have abused when the price leadership bans on its closest
followers emerged (Dijkstra & Schinkel, 2019). In the savings market, in contrast, pricing is driven by
the banks’ motivation to raise funding required to issue loans (besides e.g. cross-selling) (Džmuráňová
& Teplý, 2016; ACM, 2014). In addition, switching is less costly in the savings market (ACM, 2014; van
der Cruijsen & Diepstraten, 2017) such that there is a higher importance of smaller fringe banks offering
higher interest rates.
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are closer to the realized interest rates but are no longer independent from the changed
monetary policy environment.
3 Data
We construct our dataset by merging data from two sources. We use data from the
DNB Household Survey (DHS),17 a representative Dutch panel survey, to obtain detailed
household information, including information on debt and asset holdings. Most impor-
tantly, this comprises individual product choices for savings accounts. We retrieve data
from Dutch online comparison platforms for banking products to obtain product-level
information on savings accounts products.18 This includes the interest rate paid on the
accounts and several forms of restrictions/conditions19 applying to the account products.
We observe all changes in the interest rate20 and calculate the annual average. Further-
more, we identify the introduction date for each account product and compute how many
years a product has already been on the market.
Around 2,000 households participate in the DHS each year. While all members of the
household answer questions on general information, only members of the household older
than 16 are confronted with questions related to income and wealth. After identifying the
account product by the entered account name, we match account product information to
each observation.21 Respondents can enter information for up to seven savings accounts
17The data are collected through the ‘CentERpanel’ at CentERdata, handled by Tilburg University.
The DHS consists of several questionnaires for collecting information about household finances and
individual financial decisions. The panel of households used for the survey is designed to constitute a
representative sample of the Dutch population. Recruitment for the panel is based on a random national
sample drawn from private postal addresses. Upon commitment for participation in the panel, households
are included in a database. If a household already in the panel drops out of it, another household from the
database with similar characteristics is included in the panel. Despite previous agreement to participate
in the panel, response rates are typically around 80% and vary across the different questionnaires. In
order to achieve full representativeness, sample weights can be used. Participation in the panel is awarded
with a financial compensation (Teppa & Vis, 2012).
18We obtain most data from www.spaarinformatie.nl and also employ information from
www.spaarrekeningen.nl and www.spaarrentehulp.nl.
19These comprise: i) online usage only, ii) minimum amount requirements to open and maintain
account, iii) bonus on minimum amount on account within a quarter and base rate on remainder, iv)
fixed deposits, v) withdrawal limitations and vi) group eligibility constraints (e.g. account can only be
opened by students).
20We observe on average 1.5 changes per savings account in 2007, 1 in 2008, 6.7 in 2009, and 2.1 in
2010.
21Survey participants have to report both the name of the bank and the product name for each of
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in the survey. If a person reports several accounts, we assign the one containing the
highest amount of savings as a person’s main account. If the information on the savings
amount is not available, we assign the account yielding the highest interest rate.22 We
drop observations for which we cannot establish a match.23 Furthermore, we disregard
observations for individuals reporting that they do not have any savings account, which
corresponds to having chosen the outside option.24 Thus, we focus on modeling the
choice between different account products conditional on using this savings vehicle, and
estimating price effects for customers staying in the market. Modeling the decision for
alternative savings vehicles is beyond the scope of our paper.
In essence, our dataset includes one observation per person per year, corresponding to
the savings account a person has chosen. For every year and every individual, we expand
the dataset by all available accounts in the conditional choice set an individual is able to
choose from.
Table 1 lists the number of all savings account products in our dataset by bank and
year from 2007 to 2010. The first panel lists the amount of products offered by bank. The
three large banks (Rabobank, ING and ABN AMRO) offer multiple products including
five or more products. The smaller banks seem to specialize and often only offer one
product. Roughly speaking, we observe around 60 products in the market per year, two
thirds of which are products exhibiting at least one of the above mentioned conditions.
Thus, approximately one third of total products is for online usage only.
their accounts. Not all respondents report the exact product name, which requires a hand matching
procedure. During hand matching, we rely on a comprehensive list of account products retrieved from
‘SpaarInformatie’. Deviations in reporting from actual account names include abbreviations, typos, or
alternative naming. During hand matching we compare, on a bank-by-bank basis, the reported answers
with all available account products of the respective bank and choose the account closest in terms of
name similarity. If a survey participant specifies a bank name but no concrete account name as the
respondents have either entered ‘99’ (equivalent to ‘I don’t know’) or reported a generic word for savings
account (e.g. rekening), we assign the most often used account of that bank.
22Ideally, we would use the savings account with the highest deposits in all cases but this information
is not available in all cases. Still, there is a high positive correlation between accounts with the highest
interest rate and highest deposits for individuals reporting the savings amount.
23We drop observations for which the reported account name corresponds to another bank than actually
reported by the survey participant. We drop observations for which no account identification is possible,
as given answers are too remote from the actual account names to constitute a reliable match. We also
drop observations which could be matched but exhibit inconsistent timing. These are observations for
which respondents refer to account products which are not in the market at that time.
24This concerns individuals actively reporting that they do not have a savings account or reporting a
bank but no account name.
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Table 1: Number of products by bank and year
2007 2008 2009 2010
Rabobank 4 6 7 7
ING Bank 7 8 9 8
ABN AMRO 8 9 9 16
SNS Bank 2 2 2 2
Fortis Bank 4 5 6 -
AEGON 3 4 4 4
Argenta 1 2 2 2
ASN Bank 4 4 4 4
AT Bank 1 2 2 2
Centraal Beheer - 1 1 1
Credit Europe Bank 1 1 1 1
DSB Bank 2 2 2 -
Friesland Bank 1 1 1 1
GarantiBank 2 2 2 2
Moneyou - - 1 1
Nationale-Nederlanden 1 1 1 1
NIBC Direct - 1 1 1
OHRA 2 2 2 2
RegioBank 4 4 4 4
Robeco 1 1 1 1
Triodos Bank 1 1 2 2
total 49 59 64 62
restricted 31 40 44 42
internet only 14 19 22 21
Notes: The first panel displays the amount of all account
products offered by bank and year. The lower panel de-
picts the total amount of account products, the amount
of account products with any kind of restriction, and the
amount of account products which are internet managed
only in the market by year.
Table 2 shows the market shares derived from our sample for the years 2007 to 2010.25
For each year, our sample consists only of individuals who were observed in the previous
period in order to identify whether a person has opened a new account or (re)chosen the
(legacy) account from the previous period. In line with the market description of the
Dutch competition authority (ACM, 2014), we observe a highly concentrated market.
The three large banks account for almost 80% of the market. Following the three large
banks, the market sustains a few mid-sized banks (SNS Bank, Fortis Bank NL, ASN
25For reasons of computational convergence we additionally drop savings accounts with consistently
inferior market shares of less than 0.1%. Our estimation sample consists of 154 year × account units for
the calibration period 2007-2009.
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Bank and Aegon) and a larger group of small fringe banks.
Table 2: Bank chosen for main account
2007 2008 2009 2010
Rabobank 37.09 38.25 35.63 34.94
ING Bank 28.90 27.48 26.81 28.52
ABN AMRO 12.74 12.35 11.00 15.39
SNS Bank 4.21 4.55 4.98 6.23
Fortis Bank 3.30 3.16 4.02 -
AEGON 3.75 3.81 3.14 3.02
Argenta 0.34 0.56 0.87 0.85
ASN Bank 3.98 4.64 5.50 6.14
AT Bank 0.46 1.02 0.87 0
DSB Bank 1.48 1.11 2.01 -
Friesland Bank 0.68 0.46 0.61 0.38
GarantiBank 0.23 0.09 0.26 0
OHRA 0.34 0.37 1.31 0.94
RegioBank 0.46 0.37 0 0.09
Robeco 2.05 1.49 0.70 1.13
Credit Europe Bank 0 0.19 0.70 0.09
Triodos Bank 0 0.09 0.26 0.28
Moneyou - - 0.35 0.85
NIBC Direct - 0 0.96 1.13
Observations 879 1077 1145 1059
Notes: This table displays the distribution of banks chosen by
year in our sample. If a person reports several accounts, we as-
sign the one containing the highest amount of savings as a per-
son’s main account. If the information on the savings amount
is not available, we assign the account yielding the highest in-
terest rate. We include only individuals who were observed in
the previous period in order to identify whether a person has
opened a new account or (re)chosen the account from the pre-
vious period. We exclude all observations for which we cannot
assign a product choice, and individuals who have chosen the
outside option. The figures on bank choice are displayed in
percentage points.
There is considerable variance in the offered interest rates both across and within
banks. Figure 1 illustrates this by comparing the interest rates on accounts in 2008.
Accounts are grouped by bank and according to whether account restrictions apply or
not. For all banks displayed, restricted accounts offer, on average, higher interest rates
than unrestricted accounts. Note that Fortis Bank NL only offered restricted savings
accounts. The group of other banks offers on average the highest interest rates. Presu-
mably, smaller fringe banks have to raise awareness in the market or have to fight against
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the perception that savings deposited with big banks are safer by means of higher interest
rates. The interest rate spread between and within restricted and unrestricted accounts
indicates that banks apply product differentiation. Note further that banks offer several
unrestricted accounts at different interest rates, which seems to be implausible at first
sight. These were often introduced in different years. Anderson et al. (2014) find that
banks use product age for price discrimination. New products with higher deposit rates
are used to attract new customers while existing customers stick to old products with
lower deposit rates. In our estimation, we account for this peculiarity (switching costs).
Figure 1: Interest rate dispersion by bank (2008)
Rabobank (no conditions)
Rabobank (conditions)
ING Bank (no conditions)
ING Bank (conditions)
ABN AMRO (no conditions)
ABN AMRO (conditions)
Fortis Bank (conditions)
Other banks (no conditions)
Other banks (conditions)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
interest average [%]
Notes: This figure illustrates interest rates paid on restricted and unrestricted ac-
counts by banks in 2008. Fortis Bank NL only offered restricted account products.
Source: Price comparison websites and own calculations.
The effect of loosening monetary policy after the financial crisis in 2008 is depicted in
Figure 2. It displays the average interest rate across savings accounts for the three large
banks and Fortis Bank NL from 2007 to 2014. Since 2008, there is a steady decline in
the interest rate for all banks with the exception of a short increase starting in 2011. The
last products of Fortis Bank NL are withdrawn from the market in 2011.26
The changing macroeconomic and monetary conditions do not only affect the average
26While ABN AMRO continues these products under its name for some time, customers are successively
switched to ABN AMRO products. In our merger simulation, we keep track of the renaming to obtain
realizations to which we can compare our predictions.
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Figure 2: Development of average interest rates by banks
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Notes: This figure illustrates the development of the average interest rate across
account products by bank between 2007 and 2014.
Source: Price comparison websites and own calculations.
interest rates but also the dispersion of interest rates offered in the market. In Figure 3
we demonstrate this trend. The spread between the highest and lowest priced account
product and, more generally, the variance in interest rates was substantially reduced
between 2007 and 2014. Note that the development of interest rates follows the course
of the Euribor, which measures the averaged interest rates at which banks offer to lend
unsecured funds to each other in the euro area. Interestingly, there seems to be a change
after the financial crisis in 2008. From 2009 onwards the interest rates range above the
Euribor, suggesting that banks rely less on market funding, and increase their demand for
deposit savings. This can be explained by the increased distrust among banks. Taking
the usage of the ECB’s deposit facility as a distrust indicator (making overnight deposits
with the ECB is more expensive than lending to other banks at the EONIA27 rate),
Figure 4 shows that distrust started in 2009 and is still high as of today. This provides
additional support for our assumption of Bertrand competition in the market for savings
accounts, as the incentive for banks to compete for deposits through the offered interest
27The EONIA is the overnight equivalent to the Euribor which is higher than the deposit facility rate
but lower than the Euribor.
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rate is drastically increased. It especially holds in the year 2009, from which we obtain
pre-merger calibration data (the expected net loan rates r2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 ) for the merger simulation.
4 Estimation
We estimate the following main specification of the demand side of our model for the
calibration period 2007 to 2009:
𝑈 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽
𝑖
1(interest rate𝑗𝑡|opened=1 𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝑖2(interest rate𝑗𝑡|holding=1 𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖3internet only𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾1minimum amount𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2bonus rate𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾3other𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾4product age𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖
𝑖
𝑗𝑡,
with 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝐼, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝐽, 𝑏 = 1, ..., 𝐵, 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇.
(9)
In our main specification, our model includes bank intercepts, 𝛼𝑏, in order to account
for bank specific characteristics such as brand reputation and marketing expenses, which
potentially drive consumer choice on the product-level. Bank fixed effects capture po-
tential correlations between unobserved factors and the interest rate on the bank level.
We assume that in the retail banking market unobserved factors potentially influencing
consumer decision can be aggregated on the bank level due to several reasons. Firstly,
concerns about financial stability apply on the bank level, not on the product level. Se-
condly, differences in service quality beyond those captured by product differentiation
variables should arise only across banks, since banks potentially use the same hotlines,
online platforms, etc. for all their products. Thus, past experience for products can be
captured on the bank level. Lastly, unlike in the market for consumer goods such as cars,
differences in style and reputation should not play a major role for banking products.
The coefficients for interest rate interacted with opened and holding are random and
vary across individuals. We employ the interactions with 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑, a dummy for whether
a person opened the account in period 𝑡, and ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, a dummy for whether a person
(re)chose the same account product as in the previous period 𝑡 − 1, in order to account
for different sensitivities for the interest rate among customers. We consider individuals
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Figure 3: Interest rate dispersion by year
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Notes: This figure compares interest rates of all available account products between
2007 and 2014.
Source: Price comparison websites and own calculations.
Figure 4: Usage of ECB deposit facility
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Notes: This figure shows the usage of the ECB’s deposit facility as an indicator for
distrust among banks which prefer making overnight deposits with the ECB rather
than lending to each other.
Source: ECB Series ILM.M.U2.C.L020200.U2.EUR.
21
having chosen a new account (shoppers) to be more aware of market conditions and
investment possibilities than individuals sticking to their legacy savings account and
potentially being affected by consumer inertia. The random coefficients 𝛽𝑖1 and 𝛽𝑖2 capture
additional potential heterogeneity regarding the relevance of the interest rate for product
choice across individuals.
The following dummy variables are product characteristics serving product differen-
tiation. The dummy internet only indicates whether an account is for online usage only.
Its random coefficient 𝛽𝑖3 captures heterogeneous effects across individuals. For instance,
younger customers might be more willing to accept online self administration of their
accounts due to a higher adaptability to digital processes. The remaining product cha-
racteristics enter non-randomly into our model, assuming that the taste for conditions
is the same for all customers. The variable minimum amount indicates whether interest
payment is subject to a certain minimum deposit amount. bonus rate depicts whether
customers are rewarded for not withdrawing savings by offering a bonus on the minimum
amount within a quarter and a (lower) base rate on the remainder. other subsumes the
restrictions when an account features one or more of the following: fixed deposit plan,
withdrawal limitations, or group eligibility constraints (e.g. only for youth). The varia-
ble product age measures the time a product has already been available in the market in
years. As mentioned, banks can use the age of a product as a price discrimination tool.
We estimate our model in a panel to account for correlations in repeated decision
making by the same individual (Hole, 2007). Furthermore, in order to account for cor-
related decision making within households, we cluster standard errors at the household
level. Table 3 depicts summary statistics for the chosen savings accounts by year.
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Table 3: Summary statistics: product characteristics
mean sd min max
2007
Interest average 2.9 .78 .51 4.2
Minimum amount .28 .45 0 1
Bonus rate .16 .37 0 1
Other .12 .32 0 1
Internet .28 .45 0 1
Product age 3.5 1.5 0 5
Opened .092 .29 0 1
Holding .91 .29 0 1
2008
Interest average 3.2 1 .5 5.3
Minimum amount .3 .46 0 1
Bonus rate .18 .38 0 1
Other .14 .35 0 1
Internet .3 .46 0 1
Product age 3.9 2 0 6
Opened .17 .37 0 1
Holding .83 .37 0 1
2009
Interest average 2.8 .76 1 4.8
Minimum amount .33 .47 0 1
Bonus rate .2 .4 0 1
Other .11 .31 0 1
Internet .33 .47 0 1
Product age 4.2 2.4 0 7
Opened .5 .5 0 1
Holding .5 .5 0 1
2010
Interest average 1.9 .37 .8 2.6
Minimum amount .3 .46 0 1
Bonus rate .2 .4 0 1
Other .11 .31 0 1
Internet .31 .46 0 1
Product age 5 2.5 0 8
Opened .51 .5 0 1
Holding .49 .5 0 1
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of
variables used in the regression analysis separately
by year.
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5 Results
5.1 Demand Estimation
Table 4 reports our parameter estimates as effects on marginal utilities. We estimate
equation (9) with data from the calibration period 2007 to 2009. The three reported
specifications differ with regard to the set of bank fixed effects included. In our main
specification (column 1) containing fixed effects for all banks, most estimated parameters
are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
Regarding the interest rate variables for individuals having opened a new account
or (re)chosen their previous account, we obtain two moments for the distribution of
the coefficients, since we specified them as random. The average effect for consumers
opening a new account is substantially larger than for consumers sticking with their
legacy account. We interpret this as a first sign of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers
opening a new account can be considered shoppers who are more aware of favorable
pricing conditions. Consumers who already made a choice in one of the previous periods
react less sensitively to the interest rate, since they might be affected by consumer inertia.
A second indication for consumer heterogeneity is that the standard deviations for the
three variables specified as random are both large and statistically significant.
Account restrictions have different effects on product choice. The product restricti-
ons minimum amount, internet only, and the account restrictions subsumed under other,
affect marginal utilities negatively. This seems reasonable, as conditions such as wit-
hdrawal limitations (subsumed in other) or a required minimum amount impose true
costs or obstacles opening an account. The standard deviation estimated for the random
coefficient on internet only is surprisingly large, which could reflect heterogeneity in the
preference to self administer an account. While some customers might have difficulties
in not being able to rely on counter services at bank branches and, for example, com-
missioning transfers in online portals, others might well cope with doing so and even
appreciate products featuring well developed online platforms.28 The coefficient on bonus
28While experimenting with other specifications explicitly incorporating consumer age, we found that
the negative effect of internet only decreases and reverses for younger people.
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Table 4: Demand side estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Mean
Condition: Minimum amount -0.768*** -0.709*** -0.932***
(0.097) (0.089) (0.082)
Condition: Bonus rate 0.006 0.005 0.143*
(0.078) (0.076) (0.078)
Condition: Other -0.602*** -0.550*** -0.459***
(0.124) (0.118) (0.115)
Product age 0.550*** 0.470*** 0.408***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.020)
Interest average|Opened=1 1.324*** 1.064*** 0.781***
(0.095) (0.090) (0.074)
Interest average|Holding=1 0.420*** 0.240*** 0.045
(0.066) (0.061) (0.048)
Internet only -0.700*** -0.635*** -0.825***
(0.216) (0.217) (0.221)
SD
Interest average|Opened=1 1.438*** 1.213*** 0.969***
(0.116) (0.114) (0.112)
Interest average|Holding=1 1.275*** 1.089*** 0.869***
(0.077) (0.075) (0.065)
Internet only 4.997*** 5.021*** 5.169***
(0.401) (0.427) (0.458)
Observations 158295 158295 158295
Bank fixed effects for for each large for each
all banks and mid-sized bank large bank
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the results of different demand side specifications using the
mixed logit panel estimator for the calibration period 2007-2009. Reported coefficient
estimates represent effects on marginal utilities and not on choice probabilities. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level and displayed in parentheses. The interactions
with the interest average are mutually exclusive. A person either opened a new account
or (re)chose the previous alternative. Hence, the coefficients can be interpreted as group
averages. The first panel reports point estimates for the included coefficients. The second
panel lists the second moment of the distribution of the covariates specified as random.
All estimations include a different set of bank fixed effects which are not reported in
the table. Our main specification reported in column (1) contains fixed effects for all
banks while (2) includes fixed effects for each of the three large banks (Rabobank, ING
and ABN AMRO) and for each of the four mid-sized banks (Aegon, ASN, SNS Bank and
Fortis Bank NL). The specification in column (3) includes fixed effects for each of the large
banks only. The mixing distribution for the random coefficients is the normal distribution.
The sample size is determined by the number of individuals and the alternatives in the
individual choice sets.
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rate is not significant in our main specification. We conclude that this restriction does
not negatively affect consumer choice. Bonus interest payments on the highest balance
within a quarter do not constitute a clear-cut restriction in the sense that consumers are
always worse off in comparison to unrestricted accounts. Patient consumers might be
rewarded, while consumers in need of liquidity might lose out when withdrawing funds,
receiving on average a lower interest rate. Product age has the expected positive effect
on consumer choice, indicating potential lock-in situations for customers.
Across our three chosen specifications, results are quite similar with regards to the sign
of coefficients and statistical significance. However, the level of the two coefficients for the
interest rate increases in the amount of fixed effects included. As previously discussed,
bank fixed effects ought to be included in order to account for unobserved factors, such
as service quality, which are potentially correlated with the interest rate and affecting
consumer choice. In light of the differences between the estimates for the interest rate
on which we base the demand-side calibration of the model, we select the specification,
including all bank fixed effects for the calibration of the model. Subsuming a common
fixed effect for fringe banks could ignore possible specializations such as, for example, a
focus on sustainability (Triodos Bank).
Table 5 reports derived own-price elasticities averaged on the bank level for 2007
to 2009. Note that the signs are positive in our application, since an increase in the
interest rate usually triggers an increase in demand for savings account products. Demand
reactions are elastic such that increases in the interest rates entail a proportionally larger
demand increase. The three large banks exhibit rather low elasticities, while some of the
smaller fringe banks have quite large estimates for the own-price elasticity. The range of
own price elasticities reflects different degrees of market power and funding requirements
across banks. Larger banks seem to be able to price less aggressively, possibly due to
alternative funding sources. Over time, elasticities seem to increase on average, which
might be a result of lower interest rates generally leading to a movement on the aggregated
demand curve to a higher elasticity area.
Illustrating cross-price elasticities and substitution patterns is more challenging. Each
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Table 5: Own-price elasticities averaged by bank
2007 2008 2009
Rabobank 1.620 1.191 1.808
ING Bank 1.617 1.898 2.314
ABN AMRO 1.344 1.847 3.375
SNS Bank 4.871 4.888 4.934
Fortis Bank 2.600 2.913 5.947
AEGON 3.825 6.032 5.131
Argenta 6.176 8.049 6.102
ASN Bank 3.888 3.864 2.990
AT Bank 6.163 8.231 4.938
Credit Europe Bank 8.191 11.48 5.905
DSB Bank 3.466 4.460 5.438
Friesland Bank 3.815 2.938 3.173
GarantiBank 4.808 8.893 6.424
Moneyou - - 10.14
NIBC Direct - 12.66 10.19
OHRA 6.673 8.633 9.589
RegioBank 1.872 1.431 3.399
Robeco 1.915 1.512 1.221
Triodos Bank 2.573 1.784 4.150
Notes: This table displays the unweighted average of
own-price elasticities by bank.
year the choice set consists of between 40 to 60 products, leading to a very large number
of cross-price elasticities. To gain insight into the substitution patterns on the product
level, we regress cross-price elasticities on similarity measures for the account restrictions
employed in the demand-side estimation. The dummy variables take the value one if both
account products have the same outcome in the respective account restriction, and take
the value zero otherwise (e.g. if both accounts are internet only accounts [or both are not],
the similarity dummy for internet only is one). Column 1 in Table A1 presents the results
of an OLS regression on the similarity measures and a constant.29 The average for cross-
price elasticities is -0.069 (not in the table). The coefficients for the similarity measures
for the restrictions other, minimum amount, and internet only are statistically significant
and negative. Our intuition is that similar alternatives have increased switching activities
between them (i.e. more negative cross-price elasticities). Product age has a positive
29Column 2 of Table A1 reports the results of an OLS regressions of own-price elasticities on product
characteristics without a constant. The results show that interest rates are positively correlated with
own-price elasticities, suggesting profit-maximizing behavior of the banks applying favorable prices to
consumers where elasticities are high and vice versa.
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sign potentially indicating that consumers tend to switch to newer products once they
switch. The coefficient for the similarity measure for bonus is estimated positively and
significantly. This seems counter-intuitive to how consumers considered products with a
bonus feature similar. However, the coefficient is insignificant in the demand estimation
(see Table 4), thus the product characteristic bonus is not necessarily decisive in the
consumer decision. We conclude from these results that our model is capable of capturing
heterogeneous reactions to changes in the interest rates predicting that consumers are
more likely to switch to similar products.
5.2 Merger Simulation
Before applying the simulation procedure introduced in section 4, we comment on the
backed-out expected net loan rates 𝑟2009𝑛𝑒𝑡 . Table 6 reports summary statistics by year
and also displays the ‘markups’ defined as expected net loan rate minus interest rate. A
higher expected net loan rate suggests that banks can realize higher returns on each euro
deposited with them. The developments of mean and median reflect the course of the
average interest rate as already seen in Figure 3. We observe some rather extreme values.
Especially the negative expected net loan rates could hint at a different motivation for
offering retail depository products such as cross-selling different services.
Table 6: Summary statistics of expected net loan rates and markups
mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max
2007
Expected net loan rate 4.80 4.52 -6.58 2.73 4.30 8.27 23.68
Markup 1.89 4.42 -7.98 0.00 0.97 5.97 21.54
2008
Expected net loan rate 5.68 6.46 -4.28 2.79 4.74 9.87 41.27
Markup 2.45 6.51 -5.68 0.00 0.76 7.57 38.77
2009
Expected net loan rate 3.03 10.01 -67.28 2.38 4.00 6.24 20.11
Markup 0.23 9.85 -68.75 0.00 0.80 3.36 18.23
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the backed-out expected net loan rates
and respective markups by year.
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Turning to the merger simulation, we present our results in Table 7. Column 1 displays
simulated demand-weighted interest rate averages for 2010 for the case of joint ownership
of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL (merger). Column 2 analogously shows the results for
the case of separate ownership of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL (no merger). In both
cases we use the backed-out expected net loan vector via data from 2009 which we keep
constant in order to isolate the merger effect. In order to obtain weighted averages, we
aggregate product-level interest rates on the bank level using actual market shares of the
products from 2010 as weights. We use weighted interest rates to obtain a more realistic
measure for the final effect on consumers and to prevent our predictions from being driven
by account products with marginally small market shares. Results in column 3 present
the predicted merger effects in percentage points reporting the difference in predictions
from columns 1 and 2. For all banks, we predict negative merger effects with the highest
effects for the two merging banks ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL. In terms of percent
change (columns 4) ABN AMRO, on average, reduces interest rates by 3%, and Fortis
Bank NL by 5%. An interesting result is that the model also predicts negative effects of
about -1% for banks not directly involved in the merger, suggesting increased detrimental
effects for consumers.
In column 5 we additionally report the realized demand-weighted interest rate averages
for the end of 2010 to be able to assess the quality of our predictions. For a more
comprehensive picture, we analogously present the product-level merger effects in Table
A2. The root mean squared error (RMSE) of about 1 suggests that our predictions are,
on average, one percentage point too high. However, this is a consequence of the focus on
isolated competition effects. If we account for the changed monetary policy conditions,
our predictions come closer to actual realizations (see robustness checks below).
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Table 7: Predicted effects of the merger (2010)
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
Fortis Bank 2.613 2.740 -0.127 -4.637 1.842
ABN AMRO 2.295 2.361 -0.066 -2.789 1.706
Triodos Bank 2.435 2.457 -0.022 -0.880 1.550
Friesland Bank 2.684 2.705 -0.022 -0.795 1.767
Rabobank 2.348 2.367 -0.018 -0.779 1.757
Argenta 3.218 3.241 -0.022 -0.693 2.255
NIBC Direct 3.819 3.844 -0.024 -0.626 2.300
AEGON 2.978 2.995 -0.017 -0.567 1.693
ING Bank 2.152 2.165 -0.012 -0.567 1.740
OHRA 3.633 3.653 -0.020 -0.549 2.130
AT Bank 3.002 3.018 -0.015 -0.508 1.378
SNS Bank 2.975 2.986 -0.011 -0.379 2.171
Credit Europe Bank 3.218 3.228 -0.010 -0.309 1.600
GarantiBank 3.228 3.238 -0.010 -0.309 2.000
RegioBank 3.658 3.668 -0.010 -0.276 2.300
RMSE 0.963
Notes: This table displays simulated demand-weighted interest rate averages on the bank level for 2010
for the case of joint ownership of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case
of separate ownership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2. In order to obtain weighted averages,
we aggregate product-level interest rates using market shares as weights. Column 3 presents predicted
merger effects on the bank level reporting the difference of predicted interest rates in the merger case
in column 1, as well as predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in column 2 (in percentage
points). Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized (demand
weighted) interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger (constant) rnet.
Abstracting from the level differences, we attempt to assess the goodness of fit of our
predictions based on their power to correctly predict the ranking in terms of interest rates.
As a fist step, we plot the predicted interest rates for all savings accounts in the merger
case against their realizations in 2010. Figure 5 shows that there is a positive relationship
(correlation coefficient: 0.58). In addition, we rank predicted and realized interest rates
by interest rates, respectively, and plot these ranks against each other. Figure 6 reveals
that the main banks are close to the diagonal, suggesting that the general ranking is
captured to an acceptable extent by our model. This is confirmed by the Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient of 0.69. Computing the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient by
bank yields coefficients ranging from 0.5 to 1. Thus, despite the level-deviations, our
model yields a fair fit in terms of interest rate differences across savings accounts.
Taking a closer look at the merger effects on the individual savings accounts, we test
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Figure 5: Quality of predicted merger interest rates
0
1
2
3
4
5
re
al
iz
ed
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
s 
[%
]
0 1 2 3 4 5
predicted interest rates [%]
other Fortis Bank
ABN AMRO ING Bank
Rabobank regression line
Notes: This figure plots the product-level predictions of interest rates from our
merger simulation for the merger case using constant rnet against the realized interest
rates in 2010 with distinction by main banks.
Figure 6: Quality of predicted merger interest rates – ranks
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
ra
nk
 - 
re
al
iz
ed
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
rank - predicted interest rates
other Fortis Bank
ABN AMRO ING Bank
Rabobank diagonal
Notes: This figure plots the product-level ranks of predictions of interest rates from
our merger simulation for the merger case using constant rnet against the ranks of
realized interest rates in 2010 with distinction by main banks. Ranks increase with
interest rate.
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whether there are significant differences between the merging banks and the other banks.
Table 8 shows in the first panel that the interest rate reductions are significantly stronger
for the merging parties – regardless of whether measured in percentage or percentage
points. In addition, we compute whether there are differences across similar products. On
the one hand, we compare savings accounts with internet-only usage against others finding
that these are more affected in terms of interest rate reductions (second panel). This is
due to the fact that Fortis Bank NL only offered internet-managed savings accounts.
On the other hand, we investigate how non-restricted accounts are affected. In the third
panel, we find a indication that savings accounts without conditions exhibit lower interest
rate reductions than their restricted counterparts.
Table 8: Interest rate effects of the merger by savings accounts (2010)
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. two-tailed p
(1) (2) (3) (4) of diff. (1)-(3)
Merging bank other ABN or Fortis
Perc. change -0.543 39 -2.544 16 0.000
Perc. point change -0.014 39 -0.076 16 0.000
Internet-only usage No Yes
Perc. change -0.633 37 -2.135 18 0.000
Perc. point change -0.016 37 -0.064 18 0.000
Any condition No Yes
Perc. change -0.663 16 -1.314 39 0.081
Perc. point change -0.014 16 -0.039 39 0.025
Notes: This table shows how savings accounts are affected by the merger. It
displays merger-induced changes in interest rate measured in percentage and in per-
centage points. The first panel distinguishes savings accounts from either one of the
merging banks or from the other banks. The second and third panel distinguish
savings accounts by internet-only usage and by the existence of any condition, re-
spectively. Column 5 provides the p-value of a two-sided t test on the equality of
means.
Aiming for predictions which better account for the changed conditions in the financial
markets in 2010, we conduct three robustness checks. However, the merger effects are
not solely attributable to reduced competition in these cases. As a first check, we reduce
the backed-out expected net loan rates by the 0.4 percentage points decline of the 3-
months Euribor from 2009 to 2010. Results are reported in Tables A3 (bank-wise) and
A4 (product-wise). Judging from the RMSE, our predictions come closer to the realized
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values. In terms of merger effects, we obtain similar reductions in interest rates of about
3% for ABN AMRO and 5% for Fortis Bank NL.
In contrast to simply assuming that the Euribor drop directly translates into expected
net loan rates, we aim to establish an empirical relationship with the help of a regression
using the pre-merger period 2007-2009. Regressing expected net loan rates on Euribor,
savings account characteristics, and bank-year fixed effects, all of which capture the
expected net loan rates at the bank level, we obtain a significant Euribor coefficient of
about 1.12 (see Table A5). This suggests that a one percentage point increase in the
Euribor has a stronger level-shifting effect than previously assumed. However, in terms
of merger effects and prediction fit, we do not find very different results to the previous
check (see Tables A6 and A7). This is certainly due to the fact that the corresponding
adjustment of expected net loan rates is comparable to the previous check. (The drop in
Euribor of 0.4 multiplied by the coefficient of 1.12 yields a comparable reduction.)
Finally, we repeat the previous check based on a longer-run empirical relationship
between expected net loan rates and Euribor using the period 2007-2014. The magnitude
of Euribor coefficient rises to 2.12 (see Table A8) which translates into a stronger decline
of expected net loan rates used in the merger simulation. The merger effects thus turn
out to be somewhat larger (4% for ABN AMRO and 6% for Fortis Bank NL), while the
RMSE also reduces to 0.5 (see Tables A9 and A10). However, the computed reductions
are now also partly attributable to the loosened monetary policy. In contrast, our initial
analysis provides isolated merger effects stemming from reduced competition.
5.3 Welfare Effects
Our merger simulation hints at anti-competitive effects resulting from reduced interest
rates. To put these effects into perspective, we relate the bank-level reductions to the
amount of deposits that households made with the respective banks. We base our back-of-
the-envelope consumer welfare analysis on a statistic of the Dutch central bank reporting
a total of about 261 billion euros household deposits redeemable at notice in 2010 (year
33
average) for the entire Dutch market.30 We break down the amount of total deposits by
bank via our sample market shares from Table 2. These shares are fairly in line with the
market description of the Dutch competition authority (ACM, 2014) reported for 2011.31
Based on the estimate of the savings amount that households deposited with the
respective banks, their interest payments in 2010 would be reduced by about 69 million
euros. Table 9 provides an overview of the consumer welfare loss by bank. The highest
losses occur jointly at the merging banks (approximately 23 million euros for ABN AMRO
consumers and 14 million euros for Fortis Bank NL consumers) but also Rabobank and
ING consumers encounter losses of more than 14 and around 10 million euros, respectively.
These large amounts are explained by their large market shares so that even low indirect
merger effects impair the savings of their consumers.
Table 9: Consumer welfare effects of the merger (2010)
total consumer welfare
effects in mio euro
ABN AMRO -22.612
Rabobank -14.361
Fortis Bank -13.621
ING Bank -9.669
SNS Bank -3.529
AEGON -1.702
Friesland Bank -1.503
OHRA -0.677
NIBC Direct -0.589
Argenta -0.419
Triodos Bank -0.277
AT Bank -0.161
Credit Europe Bank -0.105
RegioBank -0.035
GarantiBank -0.012
total -69.259
Notes: This table displays bank-level consu-
mer welfare effects derived by multiplication of the
merger-induced interest rate difference with the total
amount of household deposits redeemable at notice
in 2010 by bank.
30See https://statistiek.dnb.nl/en/dashboards/household-savings/index.aspx, last accessed
on October 24, 2019.
31Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data on household deposits redeemable at notice by bank
for 2010. DNB only reports bank-level figures starting from 2014.
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In order to more thoroughly investigate the welfare effects, we make use of our
consumer-level data and take a closer look at the consumers who are affected most by
the merger-induced reductions in interest rates. In a first step we compare consumers of
the merging banks to those of other banks. In the first panel of Table 10 we report the
results of two-sided t test for different consumer characteristics. We do not find any signi-
ficant differences regarding age, gender, education or savings amount. However, there is
significant indication that consumers of ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL have a higher
yearly income than the consumers of other banks (45,000 euros compared to 34,500 euros
on average).
Furthermore, we compare consumers by the degree of interest rate reduction they
face. In the second panel of Table 10 we contrast the characteristics of consumers having
savings accounts with interest rate reduction in the upper 10th percentile (i.e. incurring a
interest rate reduction of more than 3.4%) to less affected consumers. We do not observe
a significant difference regarding age and gender; however, we find that more strongly
affected consumers are less likely to have a university degree (8% as opposed to 15%) and
also have a smaller amount of savings (12,400 euros versus 18,600 euros). We do not find
a significant difference regarding income in this comparison.
Next, we distinguish among consumers based on the percentage point reduction they
incur. Again, we compare consumers having savings accounts with reductions in the
upper 10th percentile to others. This concerns consumers having savings accounts with
reductions of more than 0.12 percentage points, which entails less consumers than before.
With this distinction we find that the more strongly affected consumers have a signifi-
cantly higher share of females and also a lower share of university degrees. When altering
the distinction to the 20th percentile, we recover the finding of lower savings for the most
affected customers, which is insignificant with the 10th-percentile distinction.
Summing up, our consumer-level welfare analysis suggests that less educated con-
sumers with lower savings are more strongly affected by merger-induced reductions in
interest rates. We keep in mind that each individual only carried a relatively small loss
resulting from the merger-induced interest rate decreases. However, these income reducti-
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ons might come at a higher individual cost in recessionary times as compared to normal
times in the business cycle.
Table 10: Characteristics of consumers by exposure to affected savings accounts (2010)
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. two-tailed p
(1) (2) (3) (4) of diff. (1)-(3)
Distinction by banks other ABN or Fortis
Age 52.91 1171 52.88 230 0.982
Female 0.45 1182 0.44 232 0.977
University degree 0.15 1182 0.13 232 0.478
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 18181.97 836 17856.83 167 0.833
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 34454.36 557 45001.04 101 0.005
Distinction by perc. change p90 p10
Age 53.07 1292 50.89 109 0.163
Female 0.44 1305 0.50 109 0.269
University degree 0.15 1305 0.08 109 0.056
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 18615.03 925 12350.21 78 0.003
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 35737.57 609 40244.90 49 0.378
Distinction by perc. points change p90 p10
Age 52.95 1342 51.80 59 0.580
Female 0.44 1355 0.56 59 0.071
University degree 0.15 1355 0.07 59 0.088
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 18219.74 963 15915.20 40 0.432
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 36341.51 629 30254.21 29 0.352
Notes: This table displays differences between consumers who are affected by the merger. The
first panel distinguishes consumers among their choice of a savings account from either one of the
merging banks or from the other banks. The second panel distinguishes among consumers who chose
savings accounts that are most affected by merger-induced interest rate decreases. Most affected savings
accounts are measured by percentage reduction in the 10th percentile. In the third panel most affected
savings accounts are measured by percentage point decreases in the 10th percentile. Column 5 provides
the p-value of a two-sided t test on the equality of means.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the competition effects of the merger of ABN AMRO
and Fortis Bank NL in the Dutch market for savings accounts in 2010. We employed
structural industrial organization methodology to single out the competition effects of
the merger from the generally lowered interest rate environment. Using consumer-level
data, we obtained model predictions for the merger effect by simulating product-level
interest rates for the two distinct cases of joint and separate ownership of the banks.
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Our analysis suggests significant effects on interest rates in the market. ABN AMRO
and Fortis Bank NL have 3% and 5% lower interest rates, respectively, as compared to
the case of no merger. Our model also predicts interest declines for other market partici-
pants not directly involved in the merger. We calculate that total consumer welfare loss
amounts to roughly 69 million euros in lost interest income (37 million euros for consu-
mers of the merging banks). While this figure only relates to a short-term perspective, our
consumer-level welfare analysis suggests that less educated consumers with lower savings
are more strongly affected by merger-induced reductions in interest rates. Especially in
recessionary times, even small income reductions might come at larger individual cost.
Our results point towards the need to heed of the additional social costs caused by
reduced competition when merging banks for the sake of financial stability. We leave
paths for future work that could focus on the long-term effects of the merger, which
could be contrasted with realized synergies (ABN AMRO reports that the merger was
completed in 2012). Potential shifts in the way how market participants compete with
each other after large-scale state interventions might be included as well, as discussed at
the example of price leadership bans. Further avenues for research comprise incorporating
financial markets in the supply side in order to more thoroughly capture the benefits of
financial stability by explicitly modeling the cost of financial distress and potential market
exits.
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Appendix
Table A1: Correlations of elasticities
cross-price own-price
Other (both accounts) -0.023***
(0.004)
Minimum amount (both accounts) -0.027***
(0.004)
Bonus rate (both accounts) 0.027***
(0.004)
Product age (same for both accounts) 0.020***
(0.005)
Internet only (both accounts) -0.094***
(0.004)
Other 0.226
(0.493)
Minimum amount 0.015
(0.329)
Bonus rate -0.817**
(0.398)
Product age -0.501***
(0.057)
Internet only -0.427
(0.332)
Interest average 2.073***
(0.102)
Observations 7824 154
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the results of different regressions of cross- and own-
price elasticities on product characteristics similarity measures and product
characteristics respectively using OLS and excluding a constant.
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Table A2: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – Product level
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
abnamro-beleggersspaarrekening 2.271 2.296 -0.025 -1.082 1.903
abnamro-bonusspaarrekeningspeciaal 2.440 2.464 -0.024 -0.984 2.100
abnamro-directkwartaalsparen 3.425 3.524 -0.099 -2.796 2.104
abnamro-directsparen 3.204 3.228 -0.024 -0.750 1.906
abnamro-groeigemakspaarrekening 1.841 1.876 -0.035 -1.869 1.500
abnamro-internetspaarrekening 2.072 2.185 -0.113 -5.191 1.500
abnamro-royaalrekening 2.888 2.912 -0.024 -0.824 2.000
abnamro-vermogensspaarrekening 3.386 3.410 -0.024 -0.713 2.404
abnamro-youngprofessionalspaarrekening 2.892 2.916 -0.024 -0.829 1.900
aegon-eigenstijlsparen 3.959 3.971 -0.011 -0.285 2.000
aegon-renterekening 1.801 1.815 -0.014 -0.788 1.000
aegon-spaarcomfort 3.395 3.405 -0.010 -0.305 2.100
aegon-sparen 2.735 2.757 -0.022 -0.791 1.547
argenta-internetspaarrekening 3.218 3.241 -0.022 -0.693 2.255
asn-ideaalsparen 3.724 3.736 -0.012 -0.313 2.305
asn-internetsparen 2.487 2.499 -0.011 -0.446 1.801
asn-optimaalbeleggen 2.518 2.529 -0.011 -0.441 2.294
asn-sparen 1.260 1.267 -0.007 -0.529 1.801
atb-internetspaarrekening 3.123 3.146 -0.022 -0.701 1.518
atb-spaarrekening 2.905 2.915 -0.010 -0.342 1.267
crediteurope-internetspaarrekening 3.218 3.228 -0.010 -0.309 1.600
fortisbank-bonusspaarrekening 2.774 2.904 -0.129 -4.454 1.767
fortisbank-ejaarspaarrekening 3.426 3.546 -0.120 -3.392 1.801
fortisbank-ekwartaalspaarrekening 3.140 3.265 -0.125 -3.814 2.200
fortisbank-eminentplusrekening 3.154 3.256 -0.103 -3.156 1.801
fortisbank-espaarextrarekening 3.578 3.697 -0.118 -3.200 2.200
fortisbank-espaarrekening 2.412 2.540 -0.128 -5.048 1.801
frieslandbank-internetspaarrekening 2.684 2.705 -0.022 -0.795 1.767
garantibank-goudeninternetrekening 3.384 3.394 -0.010 -0.296 2.107
garantibank-goudenklaverrekening 3.228 3.238 -0.010 -0.309 2.000
ingbank-bonusrenterekening 2.577 2.587 -0.011 -0.407 1.987
ingbank-comfortspaarrekening 1.461 1.472 -0.011 -0.729 1.500
ingbank-internetspaarrekening 2.030 2.052 -0.021 -1.048 1.500
ingbank-kwartaalextrarekening 2.324 2.334 -0.010 -0.449 1.767
ingbank-loyaalrekening 1.839 1.850 -0.010 -0.556 1.500
ingbank-plusrekening 0.989 1.000 -0.011 -1.065 1.500
ingbank-profijtrekening 3.623 3.633 -0.011 -0.292 2.200
ingbank-toprekening 3.112 3.123 -0.011 -0.339 2.000
moneyou-spaarrekening 3.752 3.852 -0.100 -2.607 2.196
nibc-internetspaarrekening 3.819 3.844 -0.024 -0.626 2.300
ohra-internetspaarrekening 3.467 3.490 -0.023 -0.671 2.000
ohra-maandspaarrekening 4.109 4.119 -0.010 -0.252 2.500
rabobank-groensparen 1.320 1.328 -0.008 -0.617 0.797
rabobank-internetbonussparen 2.521 2.547 -0.026 -1.020 1.800
rabobank-internetloyaalsparen 3.319 3.331 -0.012 -0.364 2.100
rabobank-raborendementrekening 2.075 2.089 -0.014 -0.647 1.801
rabobank-spaarrekening 2.115 2.128 -0.013 -0.627 1.688
regiobank-bonussparen 3.658 3.668 -0.010 -0.276 2.300
regiobank-extraplusrekening 1.394 1.400 -0.006 -0.431 1.400
regiobank-spaaropmaatvrij 2.367 2.377 -0.010 -0.421 2.573
robeco-roparco 2.133 2.146 -0.013 -0.618 1.689
snsbank-maxisparen 3.561 3.572 -0.012 -0.325 2.408
snsbank-snsinternetsparen 2.480 2.491 -0.011 -0.448 2.100
triodos-internetsparen 2.342 2.363 -0.022 -0.912 1.489
triodos-maandsparen 3.275 3.297 -0.022 -0.678 2.097
RMSE 0.963
Notes: This table displays simulated interest rate for 2010 for the case of joint ownership
of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case of separate ow-
nership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2 on the product level. Column 3 presents
predicted merger effects on the product level reporting the difference of predicted interest ra-
tes in the merger case in column 1 and predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in co-
lumn 2. Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized
interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger (constant) rnet.
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Table A3: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – robustness: rnet corrected by actual
Euribor change
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
Fortis Bank 2.239 2.364 -0.125 -5.292 1.842
ABN AMRO 1.918 1.982 -0.064 -3.231 1.706
Triodos Bank 2.057 2.079 -0.021 -1.019 1.550
Rabobank 1.970 1.988 -0.018 -0.908 1.757
Friesland Bank 2.305 2.327 -0.021 -0.906 1.767
Argenta 2.841 2.863 -0.022 -0.768 2.255
NIBC Direct 3.443 3.467 -0.024 -0.680 2.300
ING Bank 1.767 1.779 -0.012 -0.675 1.740
AEGON 2.597 2.614 -0.017 -0.636 1.693
OHRA 3.254 3.274 -0.020 -0.599 2.130
AT Bank 2.619 2.634 -0.015 -0.570 1.378
SNS Bank 2.590 2.601 -0.011 -0.425 2.171
Credit Europe Bank 2.831 2.841 -0.010 -0.343 1.600
GarantiBank 2.841 2.851 -0.010 -0.343 2.000
RegioBank 3.271 3.281 -0.010 -0.302 2.300
RMSE 0.672
Notes: This table displays simulated demand-weighted interest rate averages on the bank level for 2010
for the case of joint ownership of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case
of separate ownership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2. In order to obtain weighted averages,
we aggregate product-level interest rates using market shares as weights. Column 3 presents predicted
merger effects on the bank level reporting the difference of predicted interest rates in the merger case
in column 1, as well as predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in column 2 (in percentage
points). Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized (demand
weighted) interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by actual Euribor change.
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Table A4: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – Product level – robustness: rnet
corrected by actual Euribor change
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
abnamro-beleggersspaarrekening 1.886 1.910 -0.024 -1.263 1.903
abnamro-bonusspaarrekeningspeciaal 2.055 2.079 -0.024 -1.132 2.100
abnamro-directkwartaalsparen 3.052 3.148 -0.096 -3.040 2.104
abnamro-directsparen 2.819 2.842 -0.023 -0.825 1.906
abnamro-groeigemakspaarrekening 1.462 1.496 -0.034 -2.272 1.500
abnamro-internetspaarrekening 1.700 1.810 -0.111 -6.110 1.500
abnamro-royaalrekening 2.503 2.527 -0.023 -0.922 2.000
abnamro-vermogensspaarrekening 3.001 3.025 -0.024 -0.779 2.404
abnamro-youngprofessionalspaarrekening 2.507 2.530 -0.023 -0.927 1.900
aegon-eigenstijlsparen 3.574 3.585 -0.011 -0.308 2.000
aegon-renterekening 1.424 1.438 -0.014 -0.973 1.000
aegon-spaarcomfort 3.009 3.019 -0.010 -0.336 2.100
aegon-sparen 2.357 2.378 -0.021 -0.898 1.547
argenta-internetspaarrekening 2.841 2.863 -0.022 -0.768 2.255
asn-ideaalsparen 3.340 3.351 -0.011 -0.341 2.305
asn-internetsparen 2.102 2.113 -0.011 -0.516 1.801
asn-optimaalbeleggen 2.133 2.143 -0.011 -0.508 2.294
asn-sparen 0.866 0.872 -0.007 -0.751 1.801
atb-internetspaarrekening 2.746 2.767 -0.022 -0.780 1.518
atb-spaarrekening 2.518 2.528 -0.010 -0.385 1.267
crediteurope-internetspaarrekening 2.831 2.841 -0.010 -0.343 1.600
fortisbank-bonusspaarrekening 2.399 2.527 -0.127 -5.039 1.767
fortisbank-ejaarspaarrekening 3.052 3.170 -0.118 -3.723 1.801
fortisbank-ekwartaalspaarrekening 2.766 2.888 -0.122 -4.237 2.200
fortisbank-eminentplusrekening 2.769 2.870 -0.101 -3.526 1.801
fortisbank-espaarextrarekening 3.206 3.322 -0.116 -3.491 2.200
fortisbank-espaarrekening 2.037 2.163 -0.126 -5.839 1.801
frieslandbank-internetspaarrekening 2.305 2.327 -0.021 -0.906 1.767
garantibank-goudeninternetrekening 2.998 3.007 -0.010 -0.326 2.107
garantibank-goudenklaverrekening 2.841 2.851 -0.010 -0.343 2.000
ingbank-bonusrenterekening 2.191 2.201 -0.010 -0.467 1.987
ingbank-comfortspaarrekening 1.070 1.080 -0.010 -0.971 1.500
ingbank-internetspaarrekening 1.657 1.678 -0.021 -1.257 1.500
ingbank-kwartaalextrarekening 1.938 1.948 -0.010 -0.526 1.767
ingbank-loyaalrekening 1.457 1.467 -0.010 -0.686 1.500
ingbank-plusrekening 0.600 0.610 -0.010 -1.705 1.500
ingbank-profijtrekening 3.237 3.247 -0.010 -0.319 2.200
ingbank-toprekening 2.726 2.737 -0.010 -0.378 2.000
moneyou-spaarrekening 3.379 3.477 -0.097 -2.801 2.196
nibc-internetspaarrekening 3.443 3.467 -0.024 -0.680 2.300
ohra-internetspaarrekening 3.090 3.113 -0.023 -0.737 2.000
ohra-maandspaarrekening 3.723 3.733 -0.010 -0.272 2.500
rabobank-groensparen 0.928 0.936 -0.008 -0.856 0.797
rabobank-internetbonussparen 2.148 2.173 -0.025 -1.172 1.800
rabobank-internetloyaalsparen 2.935 2.947 -0.012 -0.403 2.100
rabobank-raborendementrekening 1.694 1.707 -0.013 -0.774 1.801
rabobank-spaarrekening 1.733 1.746 -0.013 -0.747 1.688
regiobank-bonussparen 3.271 3.281 -0.010 -0.302 2.300
regiobank-extraplusrekening 0.998 1.004 -0.006 -0.587 1.400
regiobank-spaaropmaatvrij 1.981 1.991 -0.010 -0.492 2.573
robeco-roparco 1.751 1.764 -0.013 -0.735 1.689
snsbank-maxisparen 3.176 3.187 -0.011 -0.356 2.408
snsbank-snsinternetsparen 2.095 2.106 -0.011 -0.518 2.100
triodos-internetsparen 1.964 1.985 -0.021 -1.063 1.489
triodos-maandsparen 2.898 2.920 -0.022 -0.750 2.097
RMSE 0.672
Notes: This table displays simulated interest rate for 2010 for the case of joint ownership
of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case of separate ow-
nership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2 on the product level. Column 3 presents
predicted merger effects on the product level reporting the difference of predicted interest ra-
tes in the merger case in column 1 and predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in co-
lumn 2. Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized
interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by actual Euribor change.
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Table A5: Expected loan rate estimates: pre-merger period
(1)
Internet only 1.573
(2.072)
Condition: Minimum amount 1.431
(3.072)
Condition: Bonus rate -1.544
(2.699)
Condition: Other -1.788
(1.969)
3-months Euribor (yearly average) 1.115***
(0.410)
Observations 154
𝑅2 0.387
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the results of an OLS
regression of the backed-out expected loan rate esti-
mates on product characteristics. Bank-year fixed
effects are included but not reported. They cap-
ture bank-level averages by year. Standard errors
are clustered at the account level and displayed in
parentheses.
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Table A6: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – robustness: rnet corrected by Euribor
change from pre-merger period regression
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
Fortis Bank 2.176 2.301 -0.125 -5.422 1.842
ABN AMRO 1.855 1.919 -0.064 -3.322 1.706
Triodos Bank 1.995 2.016 -0.021 -1.048 1.550
Rabobank 1.907 1.925 -0.018 -0.934 1.757
Friesland Bank 2.243 2.264 -0.021 -0.927 1.767
Argenta 2.778 2.800 -0.022 -0.783 2.255
ING Bank 1.703 1.715 -0.012 -0.698 1.740
NIBC Direct 3.381 3.404 -0.023 -0.690 2.300
AEGON 2.534 2.551 -0.017 -0.650 1.693
OHRA 3.191 3.211 -0.020 -0.609 2.130
AT Bank 2.556 2.571 -0.015 -0.582 1.378
SNS Bank 2.526 2.537 -0.011 -0.434 2.171
Credit Europe Bank 2.767 2.777 -0.010 -0.350 1.600
GarantiBank 2.777 2.786 -0.010 -0.349 2.000
RegioBank 3.207 3.217 -0.010 -0.306 2.300
RMSE 0.633
Notes: This table displays simulated demand-weighted interest rate averages on the bank level for 2010
for the case of joint ownership of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case
of separate ownership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2. In order to obtain weighted averages,
we aggregate product-level interest rates using market shares as weights. Column 3 presents predicted
merger effects on the bank level reporting the difference of predicted interest rates in the merger case
in column 1, as well as predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in column 2 (in percentage
points). Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized (demand
weighted) interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by Euribor change from pre-merger regression.
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Table A7: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – Product level – robustness: rnet
corrected by Euribor change from pre-merger period regression
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
abnamro-beleggersspaarrekening 1.822 1.846 -0.024 -1.300 1.903
abnamro-bonusspaarrekeningspeciaal 1.991 2.015 -0.023 -1.163 2.100
abnamro-directkwartaalsparen 2.990 3.085 -0.095 -3.086 2.104
abnamro-directsparen 2.755 2.778 -0.023 -0.840 1.906
abnamro-groeigemakspaarrekening 1.399 1.433 -0.034 -2.360 1.500
abnamro-internetspaarrekening 1.638 1.748 -0.110 -6.301 1.500
abnamro-royaalrekening 2.440 2.463 -0.023 -0.941 2.000
abnamro-vermogensspaarrekening 2.937 2.961 -0.023 -0.792 2.404
abnamro-youngprofessionalspaarrekening 2.443 2.466 -0.023 -0.946 1.900
aegon-eigenstijlsparen 3.510 3.521 -0.011 -0.312 2.000
aegon-renterekening 1.361 1.375 -0.014 -1.013 1.000
aegon-spaarcomfort 2.945 2.955 -0.010 -0.342 2.100
aegon-sparen 2.294 2.316 -0.021 -0.919 1.547
argenta-internetspaarrekening 2.778 2.800 -0.022 -0.783 2.255
asn-ideaalsparen 3.276 3.287 -0.011 -0.346 2.305
asn-internetsparen 2.038 2.049 -0.011 -0.530 1.801
asn-optimaalbeleggen 2.069 2.079 -0.011 -0.522 2.294
asn-sparen 0.800 0.807 -0.007 -0.809 1.801
atb-internetspaarrekening 2.683 2.705 -0.022 -0.796 1.518
atb-spaarrekening 2.454 2.464 -0.010 -0.394 1.267
crediteurope-internetspaarrekening 2.767 2.777 -0.010 -0.350 1.600
fortisbank-bonusspaarrekening 2.337 2.464 -0.127 -5.153 1.767
fortisbank-ejaarspaarrekening 2.990 3.108 -0.118 -3.786 1.801
fortisbank-ekwartaalspaarrekening 2.704 2.826 -0.122 -4.318 2.200
fortisbank-eminentplusrekening 2.705 2.806 -0.101 -3.597 1.801
fortisbank-espaarextrarekening 3.144 3.259 -0.116 -3.546 2.200
fortisbank-espaarrekening 1.974 2.100 -0.126 -5.998 1.801
frieslandbank-internetspaarrekening 2.243 2.264 -0.021 -0.927 1.767
garantibank-goudeninternetrekening 2.933 2.943 -0.010 -0.332 2.107
garantibank-goudenklaverrekening 2.777 2.786 -0.010 -0.349 2.000
ingbank-bonusrenterekening 2.127 2.137 -0.010 -0.479 1.987
ingbank-comfortspaarrekening 1.005 1.015 -0.010 -1.029 1.500
ingbank-internetspaarrekening 1.595 1.616 -0.021 -1.301 1.500
ingbank-kwartaalextrarekening 1.874 1.884 -0.010 -0.542 1.767
ingbank-loyaalrekening 1.394 1.404 -0.010 -0.714 1.500
ingbank-plusrekening 0.535 0.546 -0.010 -1.900 1.500
ingbank-profijtrekening 3.173 3.183 -0.010 -0.324 2.200
ingbank-toprekening 2.662 2.673 -0.010 -0.385 2.000
moneyou-spaarrekening 3.318 3.415 -0.097 -2.837 2.196
nibc-internetspaarrekening 3.381 3.404 -0.023 -0.690 2.300
ohra-internetspaarrekening 3.028 3.051 -0.023 -0.750 2.000
ohra-maandspaarrekening 3.658 3.668 -0.010 -0.275 2.500
rabobank-groensparen 0.863 0.871 -0.008 -0.916 0.797
rabobank-internetbonussparen 2.086 2.111 -0.025 -1.202 1.800
rabobank-internetloyaalsparen 2.871 2.883 -0.012 -0.410 2.100
rabobank-raborendementrekening 1.630 1.644 -0.013 -0.800 1.801
rabobank-spaarrekening 1.670 1.683 -0.013 -0.772 1.688
regiobank-bonussparen 3.207 3.217 -0.010 -0.306 2.300
regiobank-extraplusrekening 0.933 0.939 -0.006 -0.626 1.400
regiobank-spaaropmaatvrij 1.917 1.927 -0.010 -0.506 2.573
robeco-roparco 1.687 1.700 -0.013 -0.760 1.689
snsbank-maxisparen 3.112 3.124 -0.011 -0.361 2.408
snsbank-snsinternetsparen 2.031 2.042 -0.011 -0.532 2.100
triodos-internetsparen 1.901 1.922 -0.021 -1.094 1.489
triodos-maandsparen 2.835 2.857 -0.022 -0.764 2.097
RMSE 0.633
Notes: This table displays simulated interest rate for 2010 for the case of joint ownership
of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case of separate ow-
nership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2 on the product level. Column 3 presents
predicted merger effects on the product level reporting the difference of predicted interest ra-
tes in the merger case in column 1 and predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in co-
lumn 2. Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized
interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by Euribor change from pre-merger regression.
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Table A8: Expected loan rate estimates: full period
(1)
Internet only 1.914
(1.403)
Condition: Minimum amount -0.170
(2.151)
Condition: Bonus rate -1.719
(1.994)
Condition: Other -1.588
(1.395)
3-months Euribor (yearly average) 2.119***
(0.536)
Observations 388
𝑅2 0.418
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the results of an OLS re-
gression of the backed out expected loan rate estima-
tes on product characteristics using the full period
2007-2014. Bank-year fixed effects are included but
not reported. They capture bank-level averages by
year. Standard errors are clustered at the account
level and displayed in parentheses.
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Table A9: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – robustness: rnet corrected by Euribor
change from full period regression
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
Fortis Bank 1.784 1.907 -0.123 -6.433 1.842
ABN AMRO 1.461 1.523 -0.062 -4.063 1.706
Triodos Bank 1.600 1.620 -0.021 -1.275 1.550
Rabobank 1.511 1.529 -0.018 -1.149 1.757
Friesland Bank 1.847 1.868 -0.021 -1.100 1.767
Argenta 2.383 2.405 -0.021 -0.891 2.255
ING Bank 1.300 1.312 -0.012 -0.891 1.740
NIBC Direct 2.987 3.010 -0.023 -0.763 2.300
AEGON 2.136 2.152 -0.016 -0.753 1.693
OHRA 2.795 2.814 -0.019 -0.679 2.130
AT Bank 2.156 2.170 -0.015 -0.673 1.378
SNS Bank 2.123 2.134 -0.011 -0.504 2.171
Credit Europe Bank 2.363 2.372 -0.009 -0.400 1.600
GarantiBank 2.372 2.382 -0.009 -0.399 2.000
RegioBank 2.803 2.812 -0.010 -0.342 2.300
RMSE 0.513
Notes: This table displays simulated demand-weighted interest rate averages on the bank level for 2010
for the case of joint ownership of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case
of separate ownership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2. In order to obtain weighted averages,
we aggregate product-level interest rates using market shares as weights. Column 3 presents predicted
merger effects on the bank level reporting the difference of predicted interest rates in the merger case
in column 1, as well as predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in column 2 (in percentage
points). Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized (demand
weighted) interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by Euribor change from full period regression.
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Table A10: Predicted effects of the merger (2010) – Product level – robustness: rnet
corrected by Euribor change from full period regression
merger no-merger merger effect merger effect realized
interest rate interest rate perc. points perc. change interest rate
abnamro-beleggersspaarrekening 1.420 1.444 -0.023 -1.611 1.903
abnamro-bonusspaarrekeningspeciaal 1.589 1.612 -0.023 -1.408 2.100
abnamro-directkwartaalsparen 2.600 2.692 -0.092 -3.427 2.104
abnamro-directsparen 2.352 2.375 -0.023 -0.950 1.906
abnamro-groeigemakspaarrekening 1.003 1.036 -0.033 -3.157 1.500
abnamro-internetspaarrekening 1.249 1.356 -0.107 -7.903 1.500
abnamro-royaalrekening 2.037 2.059 -0.022 -1.090 2.000
abnamro-vermogensspaarrekening 2.535 2.558 -0.023 -0.886 2.404
abnamro-youngprofessionalspaarrekening 2.040 2.063 -0.023 -1.095 1.900
aegon-eigenstijlsparen 3.106 3.117 -0.011 -0.344 2.000
aegon-renterekening 0.967 0.981 -0.014 -1.387 1.000
aegon-spaarcomfort 2.541 2.551 -0.010 -0.386 2.100
aegon-sparen 1.899 1.920 -0.021 -1.084 1.547
argenta-internetspaarrekening 2.383 2.405 -0.021 -0.891 2.255
asn-ideaalsparen 2.874 2.885 -0.011 -0.385 2.305
asn-internetsparen 1.636 1.646 -0.011 -0.644 1.801
asn-optimaalbeleggen 1.666 1.677 -0.011 -0.632 2.294
asn-sparen 0.388 0.395 -0.006 -1.613 1.801
atb-internetspaarrekening 2.288 2.309 -0.021 -0.911 1.518
atb-spaarrekening 2.050 2.059 -0.009 -0.460 1.267
crediteurope-internetspaarrekening 2.363 2.372 -0.009 -0.400 1.600
fortisbank-bonusspaarrekening 1.945 2.070 -0.125 -6.033 1.767
fortisbank-ejaarspaarrekening 2.600 2.715 -0.115 -4.247 1.801
fortisbank-ekwartaalspaarrekening 2.313 2.433 -0.120 -4.925 2.200
fortisbank-eminentplusrekening 2.302 2.401 -0.099 -4.133 1.801
fortisbank-espaarextrarekening 2.754 2.867 -0.113 -3.947 2.200
fortisbank-espaarrekening 1.582 1.706 -0.124 -7.267 1.801
frieslandbank-internetspaarrekening 1.847 1.868 -0.021 -1.100 1.767
garantibank-goudeninternetrekening 2.529 2.539 -0.010 -0.375 2.107
garantibank-goudenklaverrekening 2.372 2.382 -0.009 -0.399 2.000
ingbank-bonusrenterekening 1.723 1.733 -0.010 -0.577 1.987
ingbank-comfortspaarrekening 0.595 0.605 -0.010 -1.684 1.500
ingbank-internetspaarrekening 1.204 1.225 -0.021 -1.681 1.500
ingbank-kwartaalextrarekening 1.471 1.480 -0.010 -0.673 1.767
ingbank-loyaalrekening 0.994 1.004 -0.010 -0.974 1.500
ingbank-plusrekening 0.128 0.139 -0.010 -7.307 1.500
ingbank-profijtrekening 2.769 2.779 -0.010 -0.362 2.200
ingbank-toprekening 2.259 2.269 -0.010 -0.443 2.000
moneyou-spaarrekening 2.928 3.022 -0.094 -3.100 2.196
nibc-internetspaarrekening 2.987 3.010 -0.023 -0.763 2.300
ohra-internetspaarrekening 2.634 2.657 -0.022 -0.842 2.000
ohra-maandspaarrekening 3.254 3.264 -0.010 -0.302 2.500
rabobank-groensparen 0.452 0.460 -0.008 -1.692 0.797
rabobank-internetbonussparen 1.695 1.720 -0.025 -1.443 1.800
rabobank-internetloyaalsparen 2.470 2.481 -0.012 -0.465 2.100
rabobank-raborendementrekening 1.232 1.244 -0.013 -1.032 1.801
rabobank-spaarrekening 1.270 1.283 -0.013 -0.988 1.688
regiobank-bonussparen 2.803 2.812 -0.010 -0.342 2.300
regiobank-extraplusrekening 0.519 0.525 -0.006 -1.091 1.400
regiobank-spaaropmaatvrij 1.513 1.522 -0.010 -0.625 2.573
robeco-roparco 1.288 1.301 -0.013 -0.970 1.689
snsbank-maxisparen 2.710 2.721 -0.011 -0.405 2.408
snsbank-snsinternetsparen 1.628 1.639 -0.011 -0.647 2.100
triodos-internetsparen 1.506 1.527 -0.021 -1.348 1.489
triodos-maandsparen 2.440 2.462 -0.021 -0.867 2.097
RMSE 0.513
Notes: This table displays simulated interest rate for 2010 for the case of joint ownership
of ABN Amro and Fortis Bank NL (merger) in column 1 and for the case of separate ow-
nership of the two banks (no merger) in column 2 on the product level. Column 3 presents
predicted merger effects on the product level reporting the difference of predicted interest ra-
tes in the merger case in column 1 and predicted interest rates in the no-merger case in co-
lumn 2. Column 4 contains the respective percentage changes. Column 5 depicts the realized
interest rates at the end of 2010. RMSE is based on the difference between column 5 and 1.
Simulation is based on pre-merger rnet corrected by Euribor change from full period regression.
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Table A11: Summary statistics: demographics
mean sd min max count
2007
Age 48 16 16 92 1,379
Female .47 .5 0 1 1,402
Number of children .8 1.1 0 5 1,398
University degree .12 .33 0 1 1,402
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 31,543 28,459 10 490,000 724
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 13,883 15,828 1 50,000 1,003
2008
Age 51 16 16 93 1,271
Female .45 .5 0 1 1,274
Number of children .78 1.1 0 6 1,273
University degree .13 .34 0 1 1,274
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 32,247 20,683 16 200,000 633
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 15,189 16,377 1 50,000 963
2009
Age 51 16 16 94 1,371
Female .44 .5 0 1 1,373
Number of children .76 1.1 0 5 1,369
University degree .13 .34 0 1 1,373
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 33,246 26,605 27 450,000 642
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 15,418 16,058 1 50,000 978
2010
Age 53 16 16 88 1,404
Female .44 .5 0 1 1,417
Number of children .68 1.1 0 6 1,415
University degree .14 .35 0 1 1,417
Yearly gross earned income in EUR 36,405 34,472 150 600,000 657
Savings on savings accounts in EUR 18,427 18,183 1 50,000 990
Notes: This table displays summary statistics on selected variables regarding demographics by year.
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